This paper introduces pragmatic hypotheses and relates this concept to the spiral of scientific evolution. Previous works determined a characterization of logically consistent statistical hypothesis tests and showed that the modal operators obtained from this test can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions.
Introduction
Standard hypothesis tests can lead to immediate logical incoherence, which makes their conclusions hard to interpret. This incoherence is a result of such tests having only two possible outcomes. Indeed, shows that there exists no two-valued test that satisfies desirable statistical properties and that is also logically coherent.
In order to overcome such an impossibility result, Esteves et al. [2016] proposes agnostic hypothesis tests, which have three possible outputs: (A) accept the hypothesis, say H , (E) reject H , or (Y) remain agnostic about H . These tests can be made logically coherent while preserving desirable statistical properties. For instance, both conditions are satisfied by the Generalized Full Bayesian Significance Test (GF-BST). Furthermore, shows that the GFBST's modal operators and their respective negations can be represented by vertices of the hexagon of oppositions [Blanché, 1966 , Béziau, 2012 , 2015 , Carnielli and Pizzi, 2008 , Dubois and Prade, 1982 , 2012 , which is depicted in fig. 1 . This paper complements the above static representation with an analysis of the GFBST in the dynamic evolution of scientific theories. The analysis is based on the metaphor of evolutive hexagonal spirals [Gallais and Pollina, 1974, Gallais, 1982] , in which the logical modalities associated to scientific theories change over time, as in fig. 2 . Our key point in this paradigm is reconciling two apparently contradictory facts. On the one hand, precise or sharp hypotheses, that is, hypotheses that have a priori zero probability are central in scientific theories [Stern, 2011b [Stern, , 2017 . On the other hand, the GFBST never accepts (A) precise hypotheses. These observations lead to the apparent paradox that, if the GFBST were used to test scientific theories, then the acceptance step in the spiral of scientific theories would be forfeited.
In order to overcome this paradox, we propose the concept of a pragmatic hypothesis associated to a precise hypothesis. While precise hypothesis are commonly obtained from mathematical theories used in areas of science and technology [Stern, 2011b [Stern, , 2017 , the associated pragmatic hypothesis is an imprecise hypothesis which is sufficiently good from the practical purpose of an end-user of the theories. For instance, Newtonian theory assumes a gravitational force of magnitude given by the equation F = G m 1 m 2 d −2 , where the gravitational constant G has a precise value.
However, the current CODATA (Committee on Data for Science and Technology) value for the gravitational constant is G = 6.67408(31) × 10 −11 m 3 kg −1 s −2 , which includes a standard deviation for the last signicant digits, 408 ± 31. Hence, it may be reasonable for a given end-user to assume that the theoretical form of the last equation is exact, but that, pragmatically, the constant G can only be known up to a chosen precision. As a result, one might wish to test an imprecise hypothesis associated to the scientific hypothesis of interest [DeGroot and Schervish, 2012, Berger, 2013] This article advocates for the conceptual distinction between a precise scientific theory and an associated pragmatic hypotheses. The alternate use of precise and pragmatic versions of corresponding statistical hypotheses enables the GFBST to (pragmatically) accept scientific hypotheses. Moreover, this alternate use allows the GFBST to track the evolution of scientific theories, as interpreted in the context of Gallais' hexagonal spirals.
Our main goal in this paper is to formalize testing procedures for a theory taking into consideration the level of precision that is appropriate for a given end-user. In order to handle this problem, we consider the end-user's predictions about an experiment of his interest. The variation in these predictions can be explained by a combination of the level of imprecision in the theory and by properties of the enduser's experiment. For instance, the latter source of variation is influenced by properties of the equipment, including precision, accuracy and resolution of measuring devices [Bucher, 2012 , Czichos et al., 2011 , and also error bounds for fundamental constants and calibration factors , Cohen, 1957 , Lévy-Leblond, 1977 , Pakkan and Akman, 1995 , Akman and Pakkan, 1996 , Wainwright, 2002 , Bishop, 2006 , Iordanov, 2010 , Gelman et al., 2014 . We propose to choose a pragmatic hypothesis in such a way that the imprecision in the end-user's predictions is mostly due to his experimental conditions and not due to the level of imprecision in the theory that he uses.
In order to develop this argument, section 2 first adapts Gallais's metaphor of hexagonal spirals to the evolution of science. Next, section 3, proposes three methods of decomposing the variability in an end-user's predictions into the level of precision of the theory he uses and his experimental conditions. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 use these decompositions in order to build pragmatic hypothesis. They build pragmatic hypotheses for simple hypotheses and then prove that there exists a single way of extending this construction to composite hypotheses while preserving logical coherence in simultaneous hypothesis testing. This methodology is illustrated in section 4. All proofs are found in appendix A.
Gallais' hexagonal spirals and the evolution of science
Following a well-established tradition in structural semantics and narratology [Greimas, 1983 , Propp, 2000 , Gallais and Pollina [1974] proposes that many classical medieval tales follow the same organizational pattern. More precisely, these narratives exhibit an underlying intellectual structure and are organized according to an underlying archetypal format or prototypical pattern. This pattern includes both static and a dynamical aspects. From a static perspective, the logical structure of the narrative is such that each arch is represented by a vertex of the hexagon of oppositions [Blanché, 1966] . The static hexagon of oppositions is depicted in fig. 1 and represents in each vertex a modal operator among necessity ( ), possibility (♦), contingency (∆) and their negations (¬). These modal operators are structured according to three axes of opposition (=== ), a triangle of contrariety (− − − ), another triangle of sub-contrariety, (· · · ), and several edges of subalteration (−→ ). From a dynamical perspective, the temporal evolution of the narrative follows a spiral ( fig. 2 ) that un- winds (se déroule) around concentric and expanding hexagons of opposition [Gallais and Pollina, 1974, Gallais, 1982] .
Since also the evolution of science can be conceived as following a spiral pattern [Stern, 2014] , its analysis can benefit from the structure in [Gallais and Pollina, 1974, Gallais, 1982] . From a static perspective, the logical modalities induced by agnostic hypothesis tests can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions.
From a dynamic perspective, scientific theories evolve as a spiral which unwinds around the following states:
• A 1 -Extant thesis: This vertex represents a standing paradigm, an accepted theory using well-known formalisms and familiar concepts, relying on accredited experimental means and methods, etc. In fact, the concepts of a current paradigm may become so familiar and look so natural that they become part of a reified ontology.
That is, there is a perceived correspondence between concepts of the theory and dinge-an-sich (things-in-themselves) as seen in nature [Stern, 2011a [Stern, , 2014 ].
• U 1 -Analysis: This vertex represents the moment when some hypotheses of the standing theory are put in question. At this moment, possible alternatives to the standing hypotheses may still be only vaguely defined
• E 1 -Antithesis: This vertex represents the moment when some laws of the stand-ing theory have to be rejected. Such a rejection of old laws may put in question the entire world-view of the current paradigm, opening the way for revolutionary ideas, as described in the next vertex.
• O 2 -Apothesis/ Prosthesis: This vertex is the locus of revolutionary freedom. Alternative models are considered, and specific (precise) forms investigated. There is intellectual freedom to set aside and dispose of (apothesis) old preconceptions, prejudices and stereotypes, and also to explore and investigate new paths, to put together (prosthesis) and try out new concepts and ideas.
• Y 2 -Synthesis: It is at this vertex that new laws are formulated; this is the point of Eureka moment(s). A selection of old and and new concepts seem to click into place, fitting together in the form of new laws, laws that are able to explain new phenomena and incorporate objects of an expanded reality.
• I 2 -Enthesis: At this vertex new laws, concepts and methods must enter and be integrated into a consistent and coherent system. At this stage many tasks are performed in order to combine novel and traditional pieces or to accommodate original and conventional components into an well-integrated framework. Finally, new experimental means and methods are developed and perfected, allowing the new laws to be corroborated.
• A 2 -New Thesis: At this vertex, the new theory is accepted as the standard paradigm that succeeds the preceding one (A 1 ). Acceptance occurs after careful determination of fundamental constants and calibration factors (including their known precision), metrological and instrumentational error bounds, etc. At later stages of maturity, equivalent theoretical frameworks may be developed using alternative formalisms and ontologies. For example, analytical mechanics offers variational alternatives that are (almost) equivalent to the classical formulation of Newtonian mechanics [Abraham and Marsden, 2013] . Usually, these alternative world-views reinforce the trust and confidence on the underlying laws. Nevertheless, the existence of such alternative perspectives may also foster exploratory efforts and investigative works in the next cycle in evolution. Table 1 applies this spiral structure to the evolution of the theories of orbital astronomy and chemical affinity. The evolution of orbital astronomy has been widely studied [Hawking, 2004] . The evolution of chemical affinity is presented in greater detail in Stern [2014] , Stern and Nakano [2014] .
The above spiral structure highlights that a statistical methodology should be able to obtain each of the six modalities in the hexagon of oppositions. Before an acceptance vertex (A) in the hexagon is reached by the spiral of scientific evolution, 
Pragmatic hypotheses
In order to derive pragmatic hypotheses from precise ones, it is necessary to define an idealized future experiment. Let θ be an unknown parameter of interest which is used to express scientific hypotheses and that takes values in the parameter space, Θ. A scientific hypothesis takes the form H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 , where Θ 0 ⊂ Θ. Whenever there is no ambiguity, H 0 and Θ 0 are used interchangeably. Also, the determination of θ is useful for predicting an idealized future experiment, Z, which takes values in Z . The uncertainty about Z depends on θ by means of P θ * , the probability measure over Z when it is known that θ = θ * , θ * ∈ Θ.
Often, it is sufficient for an end-user to determine a pragmatic hypothesis, that is, that the parameter lies in a set of plausible values, which is larger than the null hypothesis. This set can be chosen in such a way that the variation over predictions about a future experiment is mostly due to experimental conditions rather than to the imprecision in the value of the parameter. This section formally develops a methodology for determining these pragmatic hypotheses.
In order to compare two parameter values, we use a predictive dissimilarity, d Z ,
measures how much the predictions made for Z based on θ * diverge from the ones made based on θ 0 . We define and compare three possible choices for such a dissimilarity.
is the relative entropy between P θ * and P θ 0 .
Example 3.2 (Gaussian with known variance). Let
random vector with a multivariate Gaussian distribution:
The KL dissimilarity evaluates the distance between the predictive probability distributions for the future experiment under two parameter values, θ 0 and θ * . Although the KL dissimilarity is general, it can be challenging to interpret. In particular, it can be hard to establish how good are the predictions for Z based on θ * when Z is actually generated from θ 0 and K L Z (θ 0 , θ * ) ≤ . A more interpretable dissimilarity is obtained by taking d Z (θ 0 , θ * ) to measure how far are the best predictions for Z based on θ * and θ 0 . In this case, if one makes a prediction for Z based on θ * , z * , and Z was actually generated using θ 0 , then d Z (θ 0 , θ * ) ≤ guarantees that z * will be at most apart from the best possible prediction. Such a dissimilarity is discussed in the following definition. is the best prediction for Z given that θ = θ 0 . For example, one can takê
where δ Z,θ 0 : Z → R is such that δ Z,θ 0 (z) measures how bad z predicts Z when θ = θ 0 .
The best prediction dissimilarity,
where g : R −→ R is a motononic function. The choice of g in a particular setting aims at improving the interpretation of the best prediction dissimilarity criterion.
Example 3.4 (BP under quadratic form). Let
and S be a positive definite matrix. Define the quadratic form induced by S to be
The optimal prediction under θ * isẐ(θ * ) = µ Z,θ * . It follows that
In this example, BP Z can be put in the same scale as Z by taking g (x) = x. Also, two choices of S are of particular interest.
Similarly, when S is the identity matrix, eq. (2) simplifies to
Equation (4) 
Similarly, it follows from eq. (3) that, when
Conclude from eq. (6) that, if
Also, when d = 1, Σ 0 = σ 2 0 and g (x) = x both eq. (5) and eq. (6) simplify to
In some situations, Z is the average of m independent observations distributed as
, when S is the identity, and BP Z (θ 0 , θ
Although BP Z is more interpretable then KL Z it also relies on more tuning variables, such as δ,Ẑ and g . A balance between these features is obtained by a third predictive dissimilarity, which evaluates how easy it is to recover the value of θ be-
Definition 3.6 (Classification distance -CD). Letθ θ 0 ,θ * : Z → Θ be such that
θ θ 0 ,θ * assigns to each possible outcome of the future experiment z, which value of θ, θ 0 or θ * , makes the experimental result more likely. The classification distance between θ 0 and θ * , CD(θ 0 , θ * ), is defined as
CD(θ 0 , θ * ) + 0.5 is the best Bayes utility in an hypothesis test of θ 0 against θ * using a uniform prior for θ and the 0/1 utility [Berger, 2013] . By subtracting 0.5 from this quantity, CD(θ 0 , θ * ) varies between 0 and 0.5 and is a distance. Also,
where TV(P θ 0 , P θ * ) = sup A |P θ 0 (A)−P θ * (A)| and
is the L 1 -distance between probability measures.
Example 3.7 (Gaussian with known variance). Consider Examples 3.2 and 3.5. When
Note that, in this case, C D would be the same as B P if, instead of taking g (x) = x,
Although analytical expressions for CD are generally not available, it is possible to approximate it via numerical integration methods.
Singleton hypotheses
We start by defining the pragmatic hypothesis associated to a singleton hypothesis.
A singleton hypothesis is one in which the parameter assumes a single value, such as H 0 : θ = θ 0 . In this case, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to H 0 is the set of points whose dissimilarity to θ 0 is at most , as formalized below.
Definition 3.8 (Pragmatic hypothesis for a singleton). Let H
tive dissimilarity function and > 0. The pragmatic hypothesis for (7) and (8) that
Note that the size of each of the pragmatic hypothesis is proportional to σ 0 . This occurs because every one of the predictive dissimilarity functions makes the prediction error due to the unknown parameter value small with respect to that due to the data variability, σ 2 0 .
Composite hypotheses
Next, we consider pragmatic hypotheses for general hypotheses H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 , where Whenever d Z and are clear or not relevant to the result, we write P g (Θ 0 ) instead of
In order to construct these pragmatic hypotheses, we use logically coherent agnostic hypothesis tests. For each hypothesis, an agnostic hypothesis test can either reject it (1), accept it (0) or remain agnostic (1/2). Esteves et al. [2016] shows that an agnostic hypothesis test is logically coherent if and only if it is based on a region estimator. Such tests are presented in Definition 3.12 and illustrated in fig. 3 . Definition 3.11. Let X denote the sample space of the data used to test a hypothesis. A region estimator is a function, R : X −→ P (Θ), where P (Θ) is the power set of Θ.
Definition 3.12 (Agnostic test based on a region estimator). The agnostic test based on the region estimator R for testing
Besides the logical conditions on the hypothesis test, one might also impose logical restraints on how pragmatic hypotheses are constructed. For instance, let A and
Figure 3: φ(x) is an agnostic test based on the region estimator R(x) for testing H 0 .
B be two hypothesis such that B logically entails A, that is, B ⊆ A. If a logically coherent test accepts B , then it also accepts A. This property is called monotonocity , da Silva et al., 2015 , Fossaluza et al., 2017 . One might also impose that P g is such that, if a logically coherent hypothesis test accepts P g (B ), then it should also accept P g (A every i , then it should also reject P g (A). The above conditions define the logical coherence of a procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses.
Definition 3.13. A procedure for constructing pragmatic hypothesis, P g , is logically coherent if, for every logically coherent hypothesis test φ and sample point x:
In order to motivate the above definition, consider that the frequencies of A A, AB and B B in a given population are θ 1 , θ 2 and θ 3 . Note that B := {0.25, 0.5, 0.25} is a In a logically coherent procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to a composite hypothesis is completely determined by the pragmatic hypotheses associated to simple hypotheses. This result is presented in Theorem 3.14.
Theorem 3.14. A procedure for constructing pragmatic hypothesis, P g , is logically coherent if and only if, for every hypothesis
Using Theorem 3.14 it is possible to determine a logically coherent procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses by determining only the pragmatic hypothesis associated to simple hypothesis, such as in section 3.1. Theorem 3.14 is illustrated in section 4.
Besides being logically coherent, it is often desirable in statistics Stern, 2008, Stern and Pereira, 2014] and in science [Stern, 2011b [Stern, , 2017 for a procedure to be invariant to reparametrization. That is, that the procedure reaches the same conclusions whatever the coordinate system is used to specify both the sample and the parameter spaces. For instance, the pragmatic hypothesis that is obtained using the International metric system should be compatible to the one that is obtained using the English metric system. Invariance to reparametrization is formally presented in Definition 3.16.
Definition 3.15. P * θ * θ * ∈Θ * is a reparameterization of (P θ ) θ∈Θ if there exists a bijective function, f : Θ → Θ * , such that for every θ ∈ Θ, P θ = P * f (θ)
. Definition 3.16. Let P * θ * θ * ∈Θ * be a reparametrization of (P θ ) θ∈Θ by a bijective function, f : Θ → Θ * . Also, let d Z and d * Z be predictive dissimilarity functions. The functions d Z and d * Z are invariant to the reparametrization if for every logically coherent procedure for constructing pragmatic hypotheses, P g ,
Definition 3.16 states that, if Θ 0 is an hypothesis and invariance to reparametrization holds, then the pragmatic hypothesis obtained in a reparametrization of Θ 0 , say [Casella and Berger, 2002, Wechsler et al., 2013] . Also, let K L m and C D m be the dissimilarities calculated using Z m . If P g is logically coherent then, for every Θ 0 ⊆ Θ and > 0,
Theorem 3.19 states that the sequence of pragmatic hypotheses for Θ 0 induced by d Z m is non-increasing if the dissimilarity is evaluated by either KL or CD. The greater the number of observable quantities Z m , the easier it is to distinguish two parameter values θ 0 and θ * and, therefore, the smaller the amount of parameters that are taken as close to θ 0 . Also, as the sample size goes to infinity, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to Θ 0 converges to to Θ 0 . In other words, for each θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 , no other parameter value can predict infinitely many observable quantities with a precision sufficiently close to that of θ 0 .
Applications
In the following, pragmatic hypotheses for standard statistical problems are derived. Example 3.9, it follows that
The rectangular shape of these pragmatic hypotheses seems to be unreasonable as, for instance, whether a point (µ, σ 2 ) is close to (µ 0 , σ [Hardy, 2003] , H 0 , which is depicted in the red curve in fig. 5 satisfies
and g (x) = x, then it follows from Example 3.4 that
The pragmatic hypotheses that are obtained using K L, B P and C D for the HW hy- fig. 5 are further tested using data from Brentani et al. [2011] , which is presented in table 2. This study had the goal of verifying association between the APOE-4 gene and Alzheimer disease. The lower panels of Figure 5 present the 80% HPD regions for the distribution of this gene in each of the eight groups observed in the study. Additionally, they present two simulated datasets, 9 and 10. Groups 9 and 10 were generated by populations that were, respectively, not under and under the HW equilibrium. Group 9 and 10 fall, respectively, outside and inside of the pragmatic hypothesis. known. We derive the pragmatic hypothesis for H 0 :
Example 4.3 (Bioequivalence). Assume that
Such a test might be used in a bioequivalence study, where X and Y are the concentrations of an active ingredient in a generic (test) drug medication and in the brand-name (reference) medication [Chow et al., 2016] , respectively. Since H 0 is composite, it is helpful to derive the pragmatic hypothesis of its constituents.
In order to do so, let θ 0 = (µ 0 , µ 0 ), µ 0 ∈ R, θ * = (µ * 1 , µ * 2 ), and
which is a circle with center (µ 0 , µ 0 ) and radius 2 σ, as depicted on the left panel of fig. 6 . In this case, the pragmatic hypothesis is the Tier 1 Equivalence Test hypothesis suggested by the US Food and Drug Administration [Chow et al., 2016] . The pragmatic hypothesis for H 0 : µ 1 = µ 2 is obtained by taking the union of the pragmatic hypotheses associated to its constituents, as illustrated in the right panel of fig. 6 . Specifically,
The pragmatic hypothesis for H 0 using KL is obtained similarly. Note that
Figure 6: Pragmatic hypotheses using BP in Example 4.3 when σ is known.
The pragmatic hypothesis for H 0 that is obtained using CD has no analytic expression. However, by observing that N (µ, σ 2 ) = µ + σN (0, 1), it is possible to show that, there exists a monotonically increasing function, h : R −→ R, such that
That is, the pragmatic hypothesis associated to H 0 have the same shape as in the right panel of fig. 6 . They differ solely on how many standard deviations correspond to the width of the pragmatic hypothesis.
Final Remarks
The spiral structure studied in [Gallais and Pollina, 1974] can be used to describe scientific evolution. However, in order for the analogy to be complete, it is necessary to indicate what types of scientific theories or hypotheses are effectively tested in the acceptance vertex of the hexagon of oppositions. We defend that these are pragmatic hypotheses, which are sufficiently precise for the end-user of the theory.
In order to make this statement formal, we introduce three methods for constructing a pragmatic hypothesis associated to a precise hypothesis. These methods are based on three predictive dissimilarity functions: KL, BP and CD. Each of these methods have different advantages. For instance, the scale of BP and CD is more interpretable than KL, making it easier to determine whether the former are large or small. On the other hand, BP relies on the definition of more functions than KL and CD, such as δ Z,θ 0 (z) in Definition 3.3. If these function are chosen inadequately, then the shape of the resultant pragmatic hypothesis might be counter-intuitive or meaningless. Finally, CD often does not have an analytic expression. It relies on numerical integration over the sample space, which can be taxing in high dimensions.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.14. Let P g be logically coherent. Pick an arbitrary θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 and note that, if R(x) ≡ P g ({θ 0 }), then φ R P g ({θ 0 }) (x) = 0. Since P g is logically coherent, conclude that φ R P g (Θ 0 ) (x) ≡ 0, that is, P g ({θ 0 }) ⊆ P g (Θ 0 ). Since θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 was arbitrary, conclude that
Next, let R(x) ≡ θ 0 ∈Θ 0 P g ({θ 0 }) c . For every θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 , φ R P g ({θ 0 }) (x) = 1. Since P g is logically coherent, φ R P g (Θ 0 ) ≡ 1, that is, P g (Θ 0 ) ⊆ R c ≡ θ 0 ∈Θ 0 P g ({θ 0 }). Conclude that
It follows from Equations (9) and (10) that P g (Θ 0 ) = θ 0 ∈Θ 0 P g ({θ 0 }). It also follows from direct calculation that, if P g (Θ 0 ) = θ 0 ∈Θ 0 P g ({θ 0 }), then P g is logically coherent.
Proof of Theorem 3.17. where the next-to-last equality follows from the assumption that (F θ ) θ∈Θ is identifiable. The proofs for the C D divergence follows from the fact that TV(P θ 0 , P θ * ) ≤ KL(P θ 0 , P θ * ).
